Spinoza on Language
This is a draft. Please do not cite.
Version: 2020.
Luis Ramos-Alarcón, luisramosalarcon@gmail.com
Autonomous University of Mexico City
Abstract
Some scholars have understood that Spinoza’s extreme rationalism,
nominalism, conventionalism, and rejection of a semantic theory of
truth make his philosophy incapable to use language for philosophical
and scientific purposes; insofar he considered language a source of
inadequate knowledge, falsity, and error. Thus Spinoza finds
contradiction in his inevitable use of language to express his
philosophy. This paper has four aims: first, propose an explanation on
why language is inadequate knowledge for Spinoza; second, present
differences between inadequacy, falsity, and error in language; third,
argue on the Spinozian use of the geometrical method as a solution for
the adequate use of language in philosophical and scientific work;
finally, show the problems and limits of this solution for metaphysical
discussions.
Keywords: 17th Century Theory of Language, Nominalism,
Conventionalism, Memory, Denotation, Connotation.
Introduction
It is common to think that Spinoza’s extreme rationalism, conventionalism and
nominalism reject language of philosophical knowledge. While contemporary philosophers
such as Leibniz consider language as one of the primary philosophical issues to study, for
Spinoza it is only part of the first kind of knowledge. According to him words are source of
error and falsity, because¾among other things¾it gives us an inadequate knowledge of
things product of contingent associations between bodily motions and images. Spinoza
thinks that we only know things truly and adequately through intellectual inferences, i.e.,
through demonstrations made by reason and intuitive science¾, which he considers the
second and the third kinds of knowledge, respectively. Some scholars have understood that
this rationalist tenet1 concludes that language is always deceitful, thus Spinoza should have
encouraged the idea that adequate knowledge cannot relate with it.
This latter conclusion gives rise to a number of problems for Spinoza’s philosophy:
mainly, it seems that there is an unbridgeable gap between language and intellect (reason
and intuitive science), i.e., between arbitrary associations of images and ideas, on the one
part, and eternal, immutable, adequate, true ideas, on the other. If this is the case, then
language has no room in Spinoza’s philosophy, and his efforts to use it even under a
geometrical method are only proofs of his inconsistency of thought.

1

Other tenets of Spinoza’s rationalism are: the identification of logical necessity and causal necessity, thus
there is an answer to every “why” question. For Bennet (“Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” p. 61), this identification is
an error that arises from confusion.
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This paper has four aims: first, propose an explanation on why language is
inadequate knowledge for Spinoza; second, present differences between inadequacy,
falsity, and error in language; third, argue on the Spinozian use of the geometrical method
as a solution for the adequate use of language in philosophical and scientific work; finally,
show the problems and limits of this solution for metaphysical discussions.

1. Denotation in Language
For Spinoza, language is an association of images and ideas. According to him, words are
constituted by corporeal motions, and therefore involve the concept of extension. The
process of association is described by the following proposition:
“If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at
the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines one of
them, it will immediately recollect the others also.” [2p18]
And the demonstration reads:
“The mind (by 2p17c) imagines a body because the human body is
affected and disposed as it was affected when certain of its parts were
struck by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the body was
then so disposed that the mind imagined two [or more] bodies at once;
therefore it will now also imagine two [or more] at once, and when the
mind imagines one, it will immediately recollect the other also, q.e.d.”
[2p18d]
In order of understanding this, we must summarize certain principles of his metaphysics
and physics. Spinoza affirms that God is the unique substance, which expresses its essence
in infinite attributes, from which thought and extension are two of them. Because God
expresses the same essence in infinite modes through infinite attributes, there is no
interaction between attributes and their modifications; each attribute has the same order and
connection in their respective modifications (1p28, 2p7). This parallelism of the attributes
sustain that God has an idea of any modification through the attribute of thought. The
human mind is the idea that God’s Intellect has of a human body actually existing (2p13).2
Thus in order to understand and distinguish external things through language, we
should know what happens in the human body.3 It is sufficient to recall Spinoza’s definition
of image:

2

All ideas are contained by God’s intellect, i.e., by the immediate infinite mode of the attribute of thought
(1p21, Ep 64), by which God thinks all the things that he produces (1p16). For the aim of this paper, I make
no distinction between the following terms: infinite intellect (intellectum infinitum: 1p16, 1p17s, 2p7s, etc.),
God’s infinite intellect (infinitus intellectus Dei: 2p11c, 2p43s), and God’s eternal and infinite intellect (Dei
aeternum et infinitum intellectum: 5p40s).
3
For a more profound study of Spinoza’s physics and the process of sensory perception, cf. my “Spinoza on
Sensory Perception”.
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“[T]o retain the customary words [verba], the affections of the human
body whose ideas represent4 external bodies as present to us, we shall call
images of things, even if they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures
of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say
that it imagines.” [2p17s]5
The human brain retains impressions of the external bodies affections when they are
frequent (2post5).6 This process begins with an external object affecting frequently an
external sense of the human body (e.g. sight, smell, touch, etc.). The resulting brain
impression is a mode (affection) of the human body that involves the nature of both bodies
(the human body and the external body), but not in the same manner. An image is an idea
of an affection of the human body; that is, an idea of certain mode preserved in the human
body. When the human mind affirms that image, it also affirms a particular constitution of
the human body, i.e. the actual existence of the nature of the human body, as well as the
particular existence of the external body (2p16, 2p16c). At the same time, by parallelism,
Spinoza relates a constitution of the human body with an idea that the human mind has of
it; which means that the human mind has an idea of whatever happens in the human body
(2p7, 2p12). Thus an image is also a “vague experience” that the human mind has of
external objects (2p40s2); i.e., a particular point of view that a person has of certain object.
Spinoza identifies “image” and “representation” because they both require a
medium—in this case, the brain impression that involves a determinate causal affection
from an external body—that brings to the mind something that does not have to be present
at the moment of the contemplation. Spinoza calls “images of things” (rerum Imago) any
idea of a brain impression that implies the nature of an external body and represents it as if
it were present, even though it is not really present or it no longer exists. For Spinoza’s
epistemology, the contemplation of an image and the affirmation of the existence of the
object of the image is one and the same thing. This is because he considers that, for one
part, an idea is always idea of something; for the other part, there is no distinction between
an idea and the affirmation of the content of the idea. Spinoza includes as images
“affections that do not reproduce the figures of things” in order to incorporate not only
pictures, but any affection that represents an external body, such as sounds (cf. Ep 17, pp.
76-78).
Now, let us go back to the process of association of ideas described in 2p18
&2p18d. Spinoza calls “memory” (Latin: “memoria”) this process (2p18s). Even though
the demonstration does not mention it, this process of association of images happens in the
4

The Latin word is “repræsentant,” which we need to translate as “represents.” Cf. next note.
The Latin text states: “Porrò, ut verba usitata retineamus, Corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideæ
Corpora externa, velut nobis præsentia repræsentant, rerum imagines vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non
referunt. Et cùm Mens hâc ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus.”
6
This process is expressed by 2post5 in the following terms: “When a fluid part of the human body is
determined by an external body so that it frequently thrusts against a soft part [of the body], it changes its
surface and, as it were, impresses on [the soft part] certain traces of the external body striking against [the
fluid part].” Spinoza’s physics only considers mechanical impacts, and repulsive forces, but not attraction or
pulls (Bennet, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” p. 62). This general explanation contrasts with the detailed Cartesian
explanation of the affection on the pineal gland from external senses. Cf. Descartes: Treatise on Man, AT XI
174 ff.; CSM I 105; Passions of the Soul (I, 7, AT XI, 332; Descartes, 1985: 330. Cf. Description of the
Human Body, I, Preface, p. 316; AT XI, 227; Descartes, 1985: 316. Cf. Gueroult, Spinoza. L’Âme, p. 202, n.
24; Cf. pp. 171 ff.
5
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attribute of thought meanwhile¾by the parallelism of the attributes¾occurs an association
of brain impressions in the attribute of extension. When the mind affirms one of these
impressions, it immediately will affirm the other impression. Thus the human mind will
imagine both things at the same time. Spinoza puts an example:
“And from this [process of association of images] we clearly
understand why the mind, from the thought of one thing, immediately
passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first: as,
for example, from the thought of the word pomum a Roman will
immediately pass to the thought of the fruit [viz. an apple], which has
no similarity to that articulate sound and nothing in common with it
except that the body of the same man has often been affected by these
two [NS: at the same time], that is, that the man often heard the word
pomum while he saw the fruit.” [2p18s]
This process of association of ideas explains the denotation or signification of nouns. The
articulate sound “pomum” is an affection of the human body, as well as the sensory
perception of an apple. The human body is capable of being affected at the same time by
both affections, and when this process happens regularly, it retains both affections as if it
were one; thus the human mind will remember both images at the same time when it
imagines one of them. This is the origin of denotation, signification, or reference of nouns,
in which certain images of sensory perception are joined in a first train of thought. The
articulated sounds “pomum”, “apple”, “manzana” are not part of the nature of the red fruit
that they denote, but are related to it through certain natural language education. None of
these articulated sounds express the nature of the apple, but only indicate those features by
which the human body has been affected by the apple, such as certain colors, shape, smell,
taste, etc. Insofar the human mind is accustomed to call different objects by the same word,
it will be able to form a general idea of it. For instance, English-speaking people that are
accustomed to eat fresh apples, will think that the denotation of the word “apple” is a fresh
apple. On the contrary, English-speaking people that are accustomed to eat baked apples,
will think that the denotation of the word “apple” is a baked apple.
Spinoza has a conventionalist conception of language: language is grounded in
explicit or implicit agreements, such as habit, instead of relation with external reality.
Different associations of the certain things with different articulated sounds will be the
origin of different natural languages. Furthermore, Spinoza will make no distinction
between a natural language and a formal language. Through words we signify things
(2p49s: “verba, quibus res significamus”).
For Spinoza, a word is a synthesis (or association) between certain sounds and
certain images of things. These images are also synthesis of other images. Thus a word is a
sign that refers to certain images. Nevertheless scholars have pass out an important implicit
supposition in Spinoza´s thoughts on language: that a word and a proposition (or synthesis
of words) are synthesis of ideas that only differ in that the former does not make explicit
the images that it associates, whilst the latter does. As we will see in the last section this
does not mean that any proposition expresses an adequate idea; to do so is needed the
participation of reason and intuition.
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2. Language Inadequacy 1: Contingent Association
For Spinoza there is no metaphysical contingency (1p29) because everything that exists is a
modification of God (1p15), which means that it has been determined by God to exist and
act in a certain way (1p24-1p26). The human mind has a true and necessary idea of things
insofar it has an adequate idea of them, i.e., an idea that considered without the relation of
correspondence with its object, has all the intrinsic properties of a true idea (2a4). A true
idea is that which corresponds to its object (1a6: ideatum). Because the knowledge of an
object implies the knowledge of its causes (1a4), a true idea of an object implies the
knowledge of its causes. On the contrary, an idea that a human mind has is inadequate if
God’s Intellect cannot understand that idea only through the human mind but through the
human mind affected by other ideas (2p35); and this is what happens with images of
sensory perception.
It is important to note that the Ethics’ arguments mainly depend on a scheme of
completeness or incompleteness, sufficiency or insufficiency, of ideas conceived by a
human mind insofar it is considered without the relation of correspondence with its object.
This argument is founded both in the parallelism of the attributes, and God’s Intellect: an
idea that a human mind has is adequate if God’s Intellect understands that idea only
through that human mind; and that idea will have all the intrinsic properties of its
extensional object. Spinoza argues that the human mind is more capable of understanding
clearly and distinctly when the actions of its object (i.e., a human body, 2p13) depend more
on itself alone, than when they depend on other bodies that concur with it in its acting
(2p13s). For Spinoza, an association of images is an effect without causes, and by the only
use of its imagination, a human mind cannot know the intrinsic properties of things. It will
only know external features of things as it experiences them. For the purposes of this paper,
we will only consider three kinds of imaginations: sensory perception, memory, and
abstractions. 2p18s says that 2p18 & 2p18d had explained what memory is, because:
“For it is nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving
the nature of things which are outside the human body¾a connection
which is in the mind according to the order and connection of the
affections of the human body.” [2p18s]
Memory is the mental correspondence of a physical association of brain impressions. It is a
certain association of images of bodies that affect in a certain order to the human body.
This order is a diachronic (order in time) or a synchronic association of images (order in
space). Thus it is an association of images that depends on the order and connection by
which bodies have affected the human body; but this order does not express the nature (or
essence) of those bodies. Consequently Spinoza explains,
“I say, first, that the connection is only of those ideas which involve
the nature of things outside the human body, but not of the ideas
which explain the nature of the same things. For they are really (by
2p16) ideas of affections of the human body which involve both its
nature and that of external bodies.” [2p18s]
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Memory does not express the nature of things (intrinsic features of the bodies represented),
but only involves it; i.e., memory expresses only a fragmentary part of the causal process of
association of external body affections. Even though there is no metaphysical contingency
according to Spinoza (1p29), each person has a different memory (or order of associating
images) insofar they are affected by things in different order. For instance, whilst a person
includes in its meal a fresh apple, another person eats a baked apple; each one of them will
think their meals with different images of apple. Insofar the order of memory does not
express the nature of things, and that it is an association realized from the vague
experiences of a person, memory could be called contingent.7
Memory and images are not adequate ideas of the things they represent. Spinoza
continues on 2p18s:
“I say, second, that this connection [i.e., memory] happens according
to the order and connection of the affections of the human body in
order to distinguish it from the connection of ideas which happens
according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives
things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.”
[2p18s]
Memory does not represent the first causes of things, but only the way images are
associated through the way they affect at the same time to a person; especially if it is a
frequent affection. On the contrary, the order of the intellect (God’s or human’s) is the
order and connection of nature (metaphysical order).
An image is not an idea of the essence of an external object. An image is an
inadequate idea insofar they do not indicate the nature (or intrinsic properties) of the human
body nor of the external body. That is to say that the human mind does not have an
adequate knowledge of its body, of itself, and of external bodies that affect it and
regenerate it through images (which is the proof aim by 2p19).
For instance, when a person looks an apple for certain amount of time, he will be
able to retain the image of that apple, and represent the apple with the features with which
he saw it. For example, if he saw a fresh apple, he will recall the apple with the features of
certain colors, textures, smell, etc., not those of a baked apple or a painted apple. That
image does not involve the essence of the apple, but only the way in which that apple
affected the human sight.

3. Language Inadequacy 2: General Terms.
Words cannot be adequate knowledge insofar they represent images, because these do not
express adequate knowledge. Words inadequacy is clearer when we consider the process of
abstraction, which is known as Spinoza’s nominalism. The process of abstraction has it
7

Any contingency, corruption, falsity, and error should be explained by epistemology, not metaphysics. This
seems to be the aim of the second book of Ethics as we read in 2p13s, where Spinoza grounds epistemology
on physics.
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origin in the affections and the human mind capacity to represent distinctly each one of the
objects that affect the human body. Spinoza says that,
“[…] the human body, being limited, is capable of forming distinctly
only a certain number of images at the same time (1 have explained
what an image is in 2p17s). If that number is exceeded, the images
will begin to be confused, and if the number of rum images the body
is capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is greatly exceeded,
they will all be completely confused with one another. Since this is so,
it is evident from 2p17c and 2p17s, that the human mind will be able
to imagine distinctly, at the same time, as many bodies as there can be
images formed at the same time in its body.” [2p40s1]
Abstraction is a mental process that corresponds to a physical process where the human
body is overwhelmed by affections produced by external bodies, in a certain time.
Spinoza continues,
“Those notions they call Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the
like, have arisen from similar causes, namely, because so many
images (e.g., of men) are formed at one time in the human body that
they surpass the power of imagining¾not entirely, of course, but still
to the point where the mind can imagine neither slight differences of
the singular [men] (such as the color and size of each one, etc.) nor
their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only what they all
agree in, insofar as they affect the body. For the body has been
affected most [NS: forcefully] by [what is common], since each
singular has affected it [by this property]. And [NS: the mind]
expresses this by the word man, and predicates it of infinitely many
singulars. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a determinate
number of singulars.” [2p40s1]
Spinoza considers that certain kind of universal terms are formed by the imagination
according to the order in which they affected the human body. When the human mind
represents the bodies that affected its body, it will loose a lot of the features that
differentiate those bodies and will consider them under universal terms. These terms does
not represent properties of those bodies, but certain features that the human mind retained
of them as long as they affected more constantly its body. He continues:
“But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by all [NS:
men] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance
with what the body has more often been affected by, and what the
mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have
more often regarded men’s stature with wonder will understand by the
word man an animal of erect stature. But those who have been
accustomed to consider something else, will form another common
image of men¾for example, that man is an animal capable of
laughter, or a featherless biped, or a rational animal.” [2p40s1]
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Universal terms formed by the imagination receive different connotations according
to the particular experiences of each person. Meanwhile some people consider the erect
stature for defining “man”, others consider laughter or reason.

4. Language Inadequacy 3: Universal Terms.
Spinoza says:
“But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind
also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinction,
and comprehend them as if under one attribute, namely, under the
attribute of Being, Thing, and so forth. This can also be deduced from
the fact that images are not always equally vigorous and from other
causes like these, which it is not necessary to explain here. For our
purpose it is sufficient to consider only one. For they all reduce to this:
these terms signify ideas that are confused in the highest degree.”
[2p40s1]
Insofar men use universal terms constructed by their imagination to try explaining
philosophical truths, they are having innumerable controversies. This will continue if we
use transcendental terms such as “being”, “thing”, and “something” (2p40s1), because they
are the total abstraction of any difference between things, apply to any of them, and will not
let us conceive anything clearly and distinctly.
“And similarly concerning the others¾each will form universal
images of things according to the disposition of his body.” [2p40s1]
The particular experience of each person guides the way they make abstractions and bring
up general and universal terms.
For Spinoza, language falsity consists in the absence of correspondence between the
word and the body that it represents; i.e., it is a mental contemplation of an external object
through the idea of a brain impression without awareness of its lack of correspondence to
an inexistent body.
The human intellect is part of God’s Intellect, thus the former has the right to know
in the same way in which knows the latter. Human intellect comprehends reason and
intuition (these are second and third kinds of knowledge, respectively). Meanwhile the
intellect (human or divine) have an adequate idea of something, the human imagination has
only an inadequate (i.e., incomplete, mutilated, and confused) idea of that thing. Spinoza
calls this kind of knowledge “opinion” or “imagination” (2p40s2).8 2p35 says:

8

It is important to note that Spinoza introduces this text to state that this is the first way in which the mind
perceives things and forms universal notions. The second way is knowledge by signs. Although this paper
does not consider the formation of universal notions, these notions work with the information provided by
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“Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or
mutilated and confused, ideas involve.”
But this privation is not absolute, because there is no absolute ignorance according to
Spinoza (2p35d). This privation is relative
Thus, imagination or:
“[...] knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, whereas
knowledge of the second [i.e., reason] and of the third kind [i.e.,
intuition] is necessarily true” [2p41].
This has leaded some scholars to think than Spinoza should have concluded that there is no
relationship between reason and intuition with language; this statement excludes the
scientific use of sensory experience.
From this, Spinoza says that:
“[…] it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal
notions: […] from signs, for example, from the fact that, having heard
or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of
them, like those through which we imagine the things (P18S); […]”
[2p40s2]

5. Error in Language
Spinoza says that words,
“[…] are established according to the pleasure and power of
understanding of ordinary people, so that they are only signs of things
as they are in the imagination, but not as they are in the intellect. This
is clear from the fact that names given to things that are only in the
intellect, and not in the imagination, are often negative (for example,
infinite, incorporeal, etc.), and also from the fact that they express
negatively many things that are really affirmative, and conversely (for
example, uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal). Because the
contraries of these are much more easily imagined, they occurred first
to the earliest men, and they used positive names. We affirm and deny
many things because the nature of words¾not the nature of
things¾allows us to affirm them. And in our ignorance of this, we
easily take something false to be true.” [TdIE 89]

sense perception. Furthermore, Spinoza calls opinion or imagination the random experience along with the
knowledge by signs (2p40s2).
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Spinoza makes a genealogy of words: because we are born ignorant of the causes and
nature of things (order and connection of the intellect), the earliest men only used their
imagination to think themselves and the world¾and thought only through images and
inadequate ideas¾, and associated their spontaneous and inadequate thoughts with positive
terms. As men developed reason and were capable of considering the internal order and
connection of things, they realize positive ideas that rejected the inadequate ideas signified
by words already forged; thus they used negative terms to refer to positive and adequate
ideas. For instance, negative terms such as “infinite” is in reality a positive idea; meanwhile
“finitude” is a positive term that refers to a negative idea; i.e., the negation of the infinite. If
we give more importance to the word “infinite” than to the adequate conception that it
expresses (insofar is the condition of the finite), we will think that is impossible for an
infinite thing to exist.
The main problem from this different construction of denotation of general and
universal terms is the following:
“[I]t is not surprising that so many controversies have arisen among
the philosophers, who have wished to explain natural things by mere
images of things.” [2p40s1]
Innumerable controversies and conflicts follow from philosophers using general and
universal terms to try to explain the nature of things. As we have said, does terms does not
express the nature of things, but the particular biography of each person as they are affected
by their particular imaginations.
In this sense, Spinoza says at the end of the second book of the Ethics:
“I begin, therefore, by warning my readers, first, to distinguish
accurately between an idea, or concept, of the mind, and the images of
things which we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish
between ideas and the words by which we signify things.” [2p49s9]
For the Dutch philosopher, if we do not distinguish accurately ideas, images, and words
(verba), we will confound illusory things with real ones. In this passage we must read
“idea” as “adequate idea”; “image” as “inadequate idea”.
This passage shows Spinoza’s rejection of a semantic conception of truth; i.e., truth
is not a property of words or sentences, thus we must distinguish common meaning of
words and nature of things. Some scholars have seen this distinction as the origin of
contradiction in Spinoza’s usage of language: v. g. according to Savan, this passage seems
to understand language not as a medium, but as an obstacle for adequate knowledge. How
can Spinoza make any philosophical use of words such as “being”, “order”, “man”, “good”,
insofar he accepts that they are the result of the abstraction of particulars, and they are not
naturally related? Spinoza says:
“[T]hose who confuse words with the idea, or with the very
affirmation which the idea involves, think that they can will
something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm
9

The latin text says: “[…] distinguant inter ideas et verba, quibus res significamus.”
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or deny with words something contrary to what they are aware of. But
these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the
nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of
extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a
mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in
words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by
corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of
thought”. [2p49s]
Spinoza distinguishes a word and an idea, insofar the former is a mode of the attribute of
Extension and the latter is a mode of the attribute of thought. But there is no direct
parallelism between them, but the latter is certain inadequate idea that a human mind has
from thinking the former. An example of the kind of illusions that language can generate, is
the conception of the human will free from causes; i.e., the idea of the will capable of
affirming or negating any idea without causal determination. For Spinoza’s philosophy,
“free will” is an image that we can be picture through the association of the idea of the
human will and the idea of the absence of causes; but that we can picture it does not mean
that it is an adequate idea, because it is not.
When we only regard to the different associations that people make to a word, we
may conclude that: “[…] there are as many differences of brains as palates” (E1A, p. 82).
As a matter of fact, imagination took advantage over intellect in order of
constructing words.
“[S]ince words are part of imagination, i.e., since we feign many
concepts, in accordance with the random composition of words in the
memory from some disposition in the body, it is not to be doubted that
words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and
great errors, unless we are very wary of them.” [TdIE 88]
Spinoza explains that:
“[T]he imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves contain no
error, or [...] the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but
only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the
existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it”
[2p17s].
Imagination is a natural process, which expresses the positivity of its cause. The mind does
not doubt of the actual existence (presence) of the external object represented by its image,
insofar as it is not affected by another idea that excludes the actual existence (presence) of
that body. This happens when the human body (and the human mind by parallelism) has an
affect that diminishes or restrains the power or vigor (vigeo)10 of the idea that affirms the
10

Each image has a vigor (vigeant) that increases or decreases, because, “[...] images are not always equally
vigorous” (Latin: “imagines non semper æquè vigeant”, 2p40s1, Gebhart II/121, l. 8). Albeit, Spinoza doesn’t
say much about an image’s power or vigor, we can explain the increase of power by the frequency of similar
affections, and the decrease of power by the absence of similar affections. But here arises two problems, if
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actual existence or presence of the external body.11 Thus, the human mind does not err
because it imagines. Error is a consequence of ignorance. Namely, when the mind has a
private or isolated idea that excludes the actual existence (presence) of the external body
(the thing represented by the image). In other words, the human mind does not have reason
(2p49s: ratio) to exclude the existence of the external object. Through images, the human
mind contemplates external bodies as actually existing as long as there is no idea that
contradicts the existence of the external body (2p17; cf. supra);12 even though that external
body is not present or it does not exist anymore (2p17c). In the human mind there is no
affirmation or negation different from what the idea involves (2p49). The TdIE affirms that
the human mind is an intellectual automaton (TdIE §85; cf. Ep 58, pp. 265- 266).
This absence of doubt is not a mathematical certainty, because it is not the product of
an intellectual deduction. Following Descartes,13 in TTP, Spinoza calls this a “moral
certainty,” a kind exclusive of the imagination.14 An image is a negative idea, insofar as it
presents an object or set of objects but not as they are in themselves, but conditioned or
determined from a certain point of view, i.e., from the particular affection received through
its senses.
Error is the mental operation where a human mind affirms a false idea; which in case
of language means that the body represented by a word actually exists as it has been
accustomed to represent it.

6. Connotation and action
Memory does not stop with only one reference for each sign, but will associate many
images to each sign, as many experiences as the person had with that sign. This association
goes with a train of thoughts grounded in the particular habit of the person.

this were the case: first, shouldn’t we have, right now, all the images that we have had since our childhood
together with the ones we have now? Second, how do we explain age-old memories that we remember at
present? I believe that Spinoza can respond by referring to the frequency of similar affections: we remember
what is similar to what we are thinking, because the softness of the brain will not keep all of the traces it
receives, but only the more frequent and similar affections.
11
Moreover, even though each image is an idea that affirms the existence and the actual presence of an
external body, it is given in a certain mind, and it is an idea that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains the
power of that mind.
12
It is important to consider that this proposition states that what is needed to change our contemplation is an
affect (affectus), and not an affection (affectio). With this, it seems that Spinoza is confounding two distinct
disciplines: the contemplation in epistemology (affectio), and the affects and feelings in psychology (affectus).
Curley (Spinoza Collected Works: 464, n. 43) suggests that we should read “affection” instead of “affect.” He
refers to the NS translation as “mode.” But the OP and the Vatican Manuscript (Spruit and Totaro, 2011: 138,
l. 24) read the same word: “affectus.” Before 2p17, the word “affectus” only appears twice in the Ethics: in
1p8s2 (II/49) when he considers the imagination of ascribing human affects to God, and in 2a3 where he
considers an axiom that love, desire, and the like are affects of the mind that cannot be given without the idea
of the thing loved, desired, etc. But it will not be until 3d3 where he defines affectus; cf. previous note.
13
Cf. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part IV, 205-206; AT VIIIA, 327-29. Descartes, 1985: 289-91.
14
TTP 15:185-186, where Spinoza considers the good life of the prophets as moral certainty for their
teachings.
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Through other ideas related to the word’s reference, the human mind would
continue another train of thoughts, which we can call the connotation of the word. Spinoza
says that by the continuation of the process of memory,
“[…] each of us will pass from one thought to another, as each one's
association has ordered the images of things in the body. For example;
a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately
pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and
from that to the thought of war, and so on. But a farmer will pass from
the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a
field, and so on. And so each one, according as he has been
accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or that
way, will pass from one thought to another.” [2p18s]
The different experiences and habits of a soldier and a farmer constitute a different train of
thoughts that correspond to the way by which their respective bodies have associated
affections. Being the traces of a horse the sign, the denotation of that sign will be a horse
for both a soldier and a farmer. But having they different experiences with a horse, the
connotation that they give to that sign will be different: the soldier has a train of thoughts
that goes to a horseman, then to the thought of war, and so on; the farmer goes to a plow,
then to the thought of a field, and so on. Meanwhile the traces of a horse in the sand induce
a train of thoughts related with war, in the farmer they activate a train of thoughts related
with plow. The traces of the horse do not involve the nature of war neither of plow, but the
soldier and the farmer respective experiences make that relation. Thus the connotation of a
word will depend on the particular experiences of each one.
The different connotations of a same sign show the inadequacy of language, insofar
there is no univocity in language, but each one will have in mind a connotation in order on
his particular experiences. Scholars have been largely considered this, but they also have
not considered another important issue for Spinoza’s philosophy: the terms “soldier” and
“farmer” refer to specific occupations to which are related the experiences described by the
train of thoughts of people who dedicate themselves to those activities. Even though the
soldier and the farmer would discuss between them on the sense or connotation of the horse
prints, a soldier will have the same train of thoughts of other soldiers, an will happen the
same among farmers. Thus Spinoza is capable of explaining intersubjective knowledge in a
certain community, as soldiers or farmers.
Each context of denotation and connotation will impel their members to make the
same mental associations with words. Thus,
“Anyone who attempts to change the meaning of a word to which he
is accustomed will have great difficulty in afterwards sticking
consistently to the change in his speech and writing. We are thus
wholly convinced, for these and other reasons, that it could never have
entered into anyone’s head to corrupt a language but might certainly
occur to someone to misrepresent the meaning of a writer by
doctoring his texts or interpreting them wrongly.” [TTP 7, §9, p. 106]
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This is extremely important for Spinoza’s lecture on the Holly Scripture. Spinoza
proposes that a method for an adequate interpretation of Scripture should fullfill the
following condition:
“It is important to know of the life, character and concerns of each
writer, so that we may know which statements are meant as laws and
which as moral doctrine; we are more readily able to explain
someone’s words, the better we know his mind and personality
[genium et ingenium]. It is also crucial to know on what occasion, at
what time and for what people or age the various texts were written so
that we may not confuse eternal doctrines with those that are merely
temporary or useful only to a few people.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 102]
One of the keys of the interpretation of words and propositions expressed in the
Scripture–as well as it will be for any language expression–is to know the mind and
personality [genium et ingenium] of the wirter; i.e., the train of thoughts that he is
accustomed by experience to associate words with things; i.e., the biography of the writer,
his experiences, occupations, happiness, worries, concerns, character, etc. Through this
knowledge we can make an adequate interpretation of the ends that the writer thought for
his words or, what is the same, the sense of his words. Here we are not going to consider
the difficulty for us of having a complete and adequate knowledge of all the writers of the
Scripture. For the aim of my paper I am only considering the condition of knowing the
biography of the writer. That knowledge will be an adequate and complete idea of the
process in which his words have the denotations and connotations that they have. Thus that
knowledge will let us know if his words were meant to be laws, moral doctrine,
metaphysical truths or fables (TTP 7, §15, p. 110).
Spinoza says:
“Something intended to promote the practice of piety and religion is
called sacred and divine and is sacred only so long as people use it
religiously. If they cease to be pious, the thing in question likewise, at
the same time, ceases to be sacred. If they devote that thing to impious
purposes, the very object that before was sacred will be rendered
unclean and profane.” [TTP 12, §5, p. 160]
Spinoza uses the term “sacred” to refer to human actions accordant to moral precepts teach
by the Scripture. As we have seen, language acquires denotation only in relation with
certain images derived from experiences. It acquires connotation from other experiences
and actions realized by the person using the language. Thus Spinoza continues,
“Words acquire a particular meaning simply from their usage. Words
deployed in accordance with this usage in such a way that, on reading
them, people are moved to devotion will be sacred words, and any
book written with words so used will also be sacred. But if that usage
later dies out so that the words lose their earlier meaning, or if the
book becomes wholly neglected, whether from wickedness or because
people no longer need it, then both words and book will then likewise
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have neither use nor sanctity. Lastly, if the same words are differently
deployed or it becomes accepted usage to construe the [same] words
in the contrary sense, then both words and book which were formerly
sacred will become profane and impure. From this it follows that
nothing is sacred, profane, or impure, absolutely and independently of
the mind but only in relation to the mind.” [TTP 12, §5, p. 160]
There is no sacred language or words by themselves, but only in relation with the actions
that they induce. The usage of words is given by experience, and this is contained in the
connotation of words for each person, society, activity, etc.
According to Spinoza, the main objective of Scripture is not the explanation of
metaphysical truths, but the obedience of moral precepts. And those precepts are expressed
through the connotation of the words and expressions used in the text. Therefore, the dutch
philosopher says that:
“I assert only that the meaning, which alone entitles any text to be
called divine, has come down to us uncorrupted, even though the
words in which it was first expressed are deemed to have been
frequently altered. As we said, this removes nothing from the dignity
of Scripture; for Scripture would be no less divine even if written in
other words or in a different language. Thus, no one can question that
in this sense we have received the divine law, uncorrupted. For we see
from Scripture itself, and without any difficulty or ambiguity, that the
essence of the Law is to love God above all things and one’s neighbor
as oneself. And this cannot be adulterated nor penned in a slap-dash,
error-prone manner.” [TTP 10, §5, p. 165]
Spinoza says that we have lost many references of the Hebrew words used in the Scripture,
and thus we cannot translate them to other languages. Even though he is convinced that the
Scripture is a moral book wrote by people who faced the danger of loosing their state.
Moral precepts expressed in the Scripture can be translated to any language, only under the
condition that in this they induce piety in the readers. Thus for moral ends, it does not
matter that we cannot translate nor understand denotation of many words in the Scripture,
so long we can understand its moral denotation. But this seems contradictory; insofar we
have shown that connotation depends on denotation. Nevertheless Spinoza will answer that
suffices finding that connotation in the stories that express certain denotations that we can
understand.
Thus Spinoza says:
“[…] Scripture does not offer definitions of the things which it speaks
of, any more than does nature. Such definitions must be drawn from
the various narratives about different things in Scripture just as
definitions of natural things are deduced from the different actions of
nature. The universal rule then for interpreting Scripture is to claim
nothing as a biblical doctrine that we have not derived, by the closest
possible scrutiny, from its own [i.e. the Bible’s] history.” [TTP 7, p.
99]
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Even though we cannot have the denotation or definition of many words in the Bible, we
can get close to them by applying the same method that we use to know natural laws; i.e. by
induction from the actions expressed in the Scripture. And he makes his claim to interpret
Scripture by itself and not through the truth or falsity of its references.
For the interpretation of Scripture the literal sense (signification or denotation) is the
main sense. Spinoza says that:
“By obscure expressions [in the Scripture] I mean those whose sense
is difficult to elicit from the context of a passage while those whose
meaning is readily elicited I call clear. I am not now speaking of how
easily or otherwise their truth is grasped by reason; for we are
concerned here only with their meaning, not with their truth. […] To
make all this more clearly understood, I will give an example. Moses’
statements, ‘God is fire’ and ‘God is jealous’ are as plain as possible
so long as we attend exclusively to the meaning of the words, and
therefore I class them as clear expressions, even though, with respect
to truth and reason, they are exceedingly obscure. Moreover even
though their literal sense conflicts with the natural light of reason,
unless it is also clearly in conflict with the principles and
fundamentals derived from investigating the history of Scripture we
must still stick to this, the literal sense.” [TTP 7, §§4-5, p. 100]
We must distinguish between the meaning of an expression and its truth: the former brings
the relation between the expression and certain images; whilst the latter refers to the
relation between the expression and a real thing outside the human mind that grasps such
relation. The passage continues:
“In order to know whether or not Moses believed that God is fire, we
certainly must not argue on the basis of whether this statement agrees
or conflicts with reason but only from other statements made by
Moses himself.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 100-1]
“Now the word ‘fire’ also stands for anger and jealousy (see Job
31.12), and therefore Moses’ statements are readily reconciled, and we
are justified in concluding that they are one and the same. Again,
Moses plainly teaches that God is jealous and nowhere teaches that
God lacks emotions or mental passions. Hence, we must evidently
deduce that this is what Moses believed, or at least what he wanted to
teach, however much we may think this statement conflicts with
reason.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 101]
Spinoza appeals to other sacred books (in this case Job) to find the meaning of expressions
such as “fire”.
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7. Positivity in the image and its guidance under the intellect
Is there something we can do with language? Do we have to put it aside and search for truth
only in a reason and intuition that never deals with language? Does this aim have any
sense? By way of what we have already said, we can be aware that words can deceive us.
But at the same time, we know that any word is the idea of a causal physical process that
expresses the power of extension; i.e., association laws of habit.
After defining 20 affects¾such as desire, joy, and sadness¾at the end of book
three of the Ethics, Spinoza says:
“I know that in their common usage these words mean something else.
But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of
words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose usual meaning
is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish to use them.
One warning of this should suffice.” [3A20]15
This does not exclude the scientific or philosophical usage of language. It warns on
the inadequacy (equivocity) of language. This passage shows: first, a straight relation
between words and ideas, although in this case it is a relation between a word and an
inadequate idea. Second, it shows a distinction between common usage of words and a
philosophical usage, which interests more to Spinoza.
It is important to note that with the association process Spinoza between a word and
a sensory perception Spinoza can explain truth in nouns and propositions that have a
physical reference identified through sensory perception. In this case, a word or a
proposition will express a true idea if it corresponds to a physical object, being sensory
perception the medium of validation. Nonetheless the word or preposition is a sign that is
not true in itself, only if it is related to a true idea.
Now is time to ask Spinoza about words and propositions that do not refer to
physical things; mainly, what happens with metaphysical terms? Being Spinoza known as a
metaphysical rationalist, he needs to have an explanation of the use of metaphysical terms.
Spinoza says that,
“Euclid, who wrote nothing that was not eminently straightforward
and highly intelligible, is easily explained by anyone in any language.
In order to see his meaning and be certain of his sense there is no need
to have a complete knowledge of the language in which he wrote, but
only a very modest, even schoolboy, acquaintance with it, nor does
one need to know the life, interest and character of the author, nor in
what language he wrote, to whom and when, nor the subsequent fate
of his book or its variant readings, nor how or by what Council it was
authorized”. [TTP 7, §17, p. 111]
15

The following nomenclature is followed to reference the Ethics: first the number of the book; then “d”
stands for Definition; “a” for Axiom; “p” for Proposition; “c” for Corollary; “post” of Postulate; “s” for
Scholium; “d” for Demonstration; “A” for Appendix; “praef” for Preface; “lem” for Lemma. For other works:
“TTP” for Theological-Political Treatise, followed by chapter and number of page in Gebhardt’s edition.
“TdIE” for Emendation of the Intellect, followed by the number of the paragraph. “EP” for the
Correspondence, followed by the number of the letter.
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Language is part of nature,16 and there are no defects in nature, and its rules and laws
(naturae leges, et regulae) are the same everywhere. Although language does not include
its criterion of truth, we find that criterion outside it by using reason and common notions.
Words and images can offer the material for the reason to obtain common notions, since
“[w]hat is common to all things (on this see 2lem2 [of 2p13s], above) and is equally in the
part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing” (2p37). 2lem2
says that “[a]ll bodies agree in certain things”. And its demonstration states that “[...] all
bodies agree in that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by 1d1), and in
that they can move more slowly, now more quickly, and absolutely, that now they move,
now they are at rest.” This example applies to the simplest bodies (2a2’’ above; these
simple bodies are not atoms, see 1p15s).
But this statement is very important for Spinoza’s argument: “Nothing positive which
a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true” (4p1). In this
case, the knowledge of the true nature of a thing does not stop a random association that we
can have through language. But the positivity of the word rests in the positivity of its
object, i.e., in the positivity of the effect of a natural cause. At the same time, there is no
absolute falsity (2p35d), because any inadequate idea, no matter how inadequate it is, is a
fragment of (as if it were mutilated from) an adequate idea that is given in God’s Infinite
Intellect.
Spinoza says: “So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true
insofar as it is true, but because there occurs others, stronger [fortior] than them, which
exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in 2p17.” (4p1s;
bolds are ours).
Spinoza is also capable of explaining natural languages and temperament by
language: each language reinforce both denotation and connotation of words, i.e. certain
things with certain articulated sounds, images and train of thoughts of things not related
essentially with them. Therefore Spinoza can explain that language is so important for the
life of certain people.
Through the rational definition of terms, by which the human mind can recall
previous deductions, the human mind can reuse language for philosophical and scientific
purposes. In this case, words will be joined to a rational denotation by which the human
mind will follow not the contextual connotation, but the rational deduction.
This is an advancement of knowledge. What the human intellect can do with images
is to recognize it as part of an adequate idea, a true idea that explains the image as one of its
effects. The process will be as follows: First, we have to consider many images of related
phenomena. Second, we consider what is common to all these images (similarities), and
distinguish what is distinct between them. As we imagine singular things, we can perceive
their common properties.17 Moreover, “Those things which are common to all, and which
16

Images follow the Spinozian principle affirmed in 3Praef: “[...] nothing happens in Nature which can be
attributed to any defect in it, for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere
one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things happen, and change from
one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of
anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, namely, through the universal laws of nature.” Thus, any
change in nature follows the same rules and laws. Because of the parallelism of the attributes, the same rules
and laws are used to understand those changes, including images and inadequate ideas.
17
Gueroult, Spinoza. L’Âme, p. 334.
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are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (2p38). Thus,
any idea we deduce from this adequate idea will also be adequate (2p40), true (2p42 &
2p43), necessary (2p44) and eternal by its cause (sub specie aeternitatis, 2p44c2).18
For instance, the mind will reject the contextual connotation of a word, but be able of
understand it as part of a whole natural process. In other terms, the mind will be the
adequate cause of some of its images.
An image is an inadequate idea. Spinoza considers that a word is a synthesis (or
association) between certain sounds and certain images of things. These images are also
synthesis of other images. Thus a word is a sign that refers to certain images.
Scholars have pass out an important implicit supposition in Spinoza´s thoughts on
language; that is, that a word and a proposition (or synthesis of words) only differs in that
the former does not make explicit the images that it associates, whilst the latter does.
Nevertheless this does not mean that any proposition expresses an adequate idea; to do so is
needed the participation of reason and intuition.
As a matter of fact, the main problem of language is when it does not make explicit
the images that is associates, and leave to the listener the freedom to interpret the
connotation and denotation of the words as he has been accustomed to do it.
Spinoza uses geometrical order because this makes explicit the ideas that it associates with
words through definitions, axioms, postulates, and, over all, demonstrations.
For the Dutch philosopher, the geometrical order is a kind of mental map that point out
metaphysical entities and distinguishes them from mental entities (both entities from
imagination and entities from reason), and indicates certain results that we must expect so
long as we are doing the correct inferences and mental associations with them.
If my reading is correct, there are a number of dangers, among which: how can be sure that
we are making true inferences or demonstrations, and not just associations imposed through
an authority argument. Examples of the Spinozian use of the authority argument are the
pretended analogies between geometry and metaphysics, where Spinoza says that in the
same manner in which the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (2p49s,
4p57s), the demonstration of a metaphysical entity X is also self-evident. What Spinoza
must demonstrate is the reality and properties of that entity X through its constitutive
elements, or something like that, but not through other things to which it is not
metaphysically related, as happens with an analogy.

Conclusions
I have argued that language gives an inadequate knowledge of things insofar it is an
idea of images and bodily motions associated arbitrarily; thus it represents fragments of a
18

Klever (“Axioms in Spinoza’s Science and Philosophy of Science,” p. 182) comments that for Spinoza,
“[t]he objective of science is: the concatenation of our perceptions (or, if one prefers this language, the
phenomena). We try to bring them together and to integrate them in one model of the universe (or a section of
it). There is, of course, no one-way-traffic: cross-sectional relationships are unavoidable. The way in which
we can reach this endpoint is, the deduction of our perceptions (=phenomena) from general, all-pervasive
characteristics or properties; or, in other words, the understanding of the diverse phenomena as appearances
from fundamental axioms or laws.” Klever supports his view with TTP 5,§37 and TTP 7, §§6-7 and §12.
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complete causal process. I also have stated that language falsity consists in the absence of
correspondence between the word and a real thing. Meanwhile error is the mental operation
where a human mind affirms that the thing represented by a word actually exists. In order
to do these I have studied four examples of language in the Ethics: 1) the word “pomum”
and its denotation (reference, significatio) is the association of two bodily motions (2p18s);
2) the horse prints in the sand and its connotations (sensus) are the train of thoughts joined
through habit (2p18s); 3) universal terms (“man”, “horse”, “good”) are certain degree of
abstraction of particulars by habit (2p40s1); and 4) transcendental terms (“being”, “thing”)
are a total abstraction of particulars (2p40s1). Lastly, I have proposed that¾for
Spinoza¾language inadequacy can be overcome by a rational model that incorporates
words redefined and related with common notions, intuitions, and the result of rational
deduction; in which case language follows adequate ideas, and be signs of true knowledge.
Geometrical method offers such rational model. But the application of this method to
metaphysics is not straightforward, as Spinoza intended.
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